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Abstract. The proposed paper is focused on media co-regulation and 
civic accountability from the perspective of religious ethos. The author analy-
ses the process of religion mediatization in the Russian public sphere and 
presents the findings of a case study of the project entitled “Public Council on 
Morality for TV”. Classifying different situations when religions face the me-
dia and vice versa, the paper presents some empirically fixed facts and trends 
of dysfunction and corruption in the religious life coverage in Russia. Dra-
wing attention to several particular features of the Russian context (public 
opinion, autonomy of journalists, agenda-setting and management problem, 
etc.), the author puts forward a set of significant obstacles for the moral con-
trol of the media: the axiological problem (the lack of value consensus in the 
Russian society), the evaluative problem (absence of a moral monitoring in 
the mass media and the public sphere), and the communicative problem (the 
absence of a well-articulated dialogue of value systems). 
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Introduction
The current situation in the Russian TV is a permanent source of 
concern for many people in Russia, often expressed publicly in the me-
dia and scholar discourse (Vartanova, 2007; Richter 2007). But the first 
public debate on the necessity of institutional social control over the 
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Russian TV programs was raised by religious organizations and then 
supported by other groups of civil society.
Religious demand for the media civic accountability is historically 
rooted and has been traditional for centuries, but in the post-Soviet 
context, after seven decades of systematic “atheization”, the religious 
factor in the media co-regulation is rather new, “innovative”.
Nowadays, the Russian civil society has different instruments to 
control social institutions established for public service (government, 
the media, etc.). However, all possible instruments are not used suffi-
ciently or effectively as the society is facing problems with the impact 
on and control over the TV.
The media law is very liberal but at the same time is intended rather 
to defend the TV produced than to control it (until now, the Russian 
Federation does not have a special law regulating the broadcasting ac-
tivity).
In 1999, the federal law proposal “On a Higher Council for the De-
fense of Morality in Television and Radio Broadcasting in the Russian 
Federation” was passed through the State Duma (Parliament) and was 
approved by the Council of the Federation. However, President Boris 
Yeltsin vetoed the law proposal.
The civil society in Russia is not matured enough in general to have a 
strong and influential body for TV control from the moral perspective, 
because in fact there is no consensus on moral norms, on what is good 
and what is bad inside the society. To blame somebody for immorali-
ty, it is necessary to have a clear point of view on what morality is, to 
achieve a consensus on this question. A special group in the Mi nistry 
for Culture and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation has 
been working for about one year trying to define the term “public mo-
rality”, to formulate its features and criteria, the possible ways of its vio-
lation. This work was begun in order to make a constant monitoring of 
the violation of morality in the Russian media. However, the results of 
this work have not yet been made public. One of the possible reasons 
for this is some fundamental challenges for achieving a consensus in 
moral reasoning, which has not been taken into consideration.
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1. Religious perspective of the media accountability
The interaction of the media and religion as two social subsystems in 
the public sphere is interesting from the perspective of the civic control 
of the media. 
Can we precisely describe the media as a social sub-system not ta-
king into consideration religion as another influent sub-system? The 
answer is rather negative in the retrospective of the so-called “cartoon 
scandals”, persecutions of Christians in some countries and other 
events, which had implicitly or even explicitly a “religious factor” in 
their background. “The increasing presence of religion in public life has 
provoked an ambivalent response from contemporary scholars trying 
to understand what is the nature of religion, what its proper role should 
be, and what its efflorescence means for our understanding of the na-
ture of politics and society”, point out Charles Hirschkind and Brian 
Larkin (Hirschkind and Larkin, 2008:1).
When religion appears beyond the private sphere, it sometimes be-
comes an effective tool of social mobilization and solidarity (like in the 
USSR during World War II) and sometimes an instrument for manipu-
lation with mass consciousness (like the wrongly and aggressively in-
terpreted “jihad” which caused some terrorist attacks).
“We live in a world where the media, the political, and the religious 
cannot be seen as distinct phenomena but, rather, as mutually constitu-
tive” (ibid: 3).
The relations between religions and mass media – their tensions, 
conflicts, mutual understanding and “modus vivendi” – make a signifi-
cant factor for the social stability and modernization of post-soviet Rus-
sia in the perspective of civil society. That is why they are becoming 
more attractive for research – from phenomenological description to 
structural and functional analysis.
The process of mediatization with its conditions, reasons, effects 
must be taken into consideration in order to comprehend the moral 
role of religion in society and its impact on the media themselves. Reli-
gions are actualized not only in the modes of practice and worship, but 
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they also have manifestations in the public sphere of a certain society, 
and they have become a subject of research with a long history (Reli-
gion and Media, 2001; Mitchell and Marriage, 2003; Meyer and Moors, 
2006; Stout, 2006; Taylor, 2007).
In order to avoid dysfunctions and conflicts in practice, it is highly 
recommended to study the media–religion relations (Hoover, 2006).
Religions and the mass media are among most influential social 
institutions in Russia. The role of “the forth power” is traditional for 
the media for at least the last century, while religions as influent agents 
appeared on the Russian public scene in last two decades.
1.1. Religions facing the media
Religions observe the media in moral discourses (sermons, letters, 
official documents, etc.) giving evaluation from the normative point of 
view, deriving from the “creed” of each particular faith. The religious 
media criticism recognizes competition between Religion and the Me-
dia and is focused mostly on ethical issues, on the moral impact of the 
media on the audience. “Ad hoc” protests against some films, TV shows 
(“Dom”, “Za steklom”, erotic movies) and concerts of controversial 
pop-stars (Madonna, Satanists’ groups) happen in Russia as well. 
This point is becoming more visible in Russia over the last years: 
religious initiatives on moral control towards the media are part of a hot 
public debate.
Besides the moral monitoring, religions traditionally use the media 
in religious formats: for spreading religious texts, transmitting events, 
ceremonies, etc. In the Russian context, for example, the public TV 
transmits Christmas and Easter Orthodox celebrations.
Religions also use their own religious media (papers, radio, TV, 
Internet-based media). They are developing rapidly in Russia in order 
to ensure the influence of religion to the audience and on compete the 
secular media in order to minimize its “negative” impact. The problem 
of “translation” from the religious language to the secular one makes 
this usage difficult for religion.
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Religions try to expand their influence on secular media, deman-
ding more space in the press, more time in radio and TV, insisting on 
the positive religious life coverage to be a must for secular media.
Religions use the media’s activity for PR purposes – for promoting 
some big events which need support of the media (Patriarch’s visits, 
social and charitable service of the Russian Orthodox Church, educa-
tional initiatives, property restitution).
1.2. The media facing religions
There are three main ways of the mediatization of religions:
1. The media allow, enable, and help the self-presentations of reli-
gions, observe their activity in public interest keeping religious 
formats (broadcasting services, funerals, weddings, etc.).
2. The media cover the religious life (news reports, feature stories, 
etc.), having a critical approach towards some social activity or 
religious institutions.
3. The media use religion for their own aims selectively importing 
well-known religious symbols into entertainment, keeping out 
sacral meanings and secularizing the essence of religion. This 
process is out of the control of religious authorities and therefore 
causes many complaints and conflicts.
The first way of mediatization is more or less understandable and 
depends more or less on the media institutions’ good will and the au-
dience demand. In most cases it keeps the religious format “untouched”, 
and the media are used more as a channel of transmission rather than an 
active subject of interaction.
The second and the third ways presume a more active role of jour-
nalists covering religion. The process is becoming more important and 
at the same time more problematic. Conflicts and scandals are rooted in 
misunderstanding or even in a bad reporting on religious issues.
The lack of knowledge about and experience in religious life among 
journalists gives much more space for myths and stereotypes in public 
opinion. There is an evident temptation for journalists to feed the au-
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dience not with what is happening in reality but what fits into peop-
le’s expectations, based on myths and stereotypes. The explanations of 
such a style of journalism may be different – from the understandable 
desire to become more popular and to get a higher position in rating 
to the political manipulation laziness and the low professionalism of 
journa lists without any particular aims.
The current state of the mass media in terms of the correctness and 
validity of information is a permanent source of concern for many reli-
gious organizations in Russia. 
How wide this “stereotype-oriented” journalism is spread in the 
cove rage of religion? 
The research of such kind has been conducted at the Journalism Fa-
culty of Moscow State University since 2007. Some preliminary results 
give a possibility to put forward several hypotheses for proving them by 
the methods of a qualitative as well as a quantitative analysis.
One of the possible answers could be given thanks to new Internet-
based technologies and also a new research design for the mechanisms 
of seeking, rewriting, and spreading of information, which we call 
“trace-study” (Khroul, 2009).
The research conducted in the field of the Russian media clarifies 
the functioning of mass information spreading mechanisms – “media 
flows”. 
A “trace-study” as a research design could be applied from the mo-
ment of its birth or creation “comets” of the media reality which “trajec-
tory” researchers could follow and study due to the modern “optics” 
of high quality – computer-indexed news data bases and searching sys-
tems (such as world well-known Google, Yahoo and the Russian leaders 
Yandex, Integrum etc.).
For the “trace-study” of religion coverage, we chose the media flow 
about “seven new mortal sins declared by Vatican”. Most of news on this 
subject have been published in the Russian media during one week – 
from 10 to 16 March 2008.
We have analyzed 233 texts about “seven new mortal sins”, pub-
lished in the Russian media (news agencies, newspapers, weeklies, ra-
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dio, TV and the Internet). We have analyzed the texts using several 
categories – time, region, the type of the media, the genre of the text, 
the reliability and correctness of links and sources, the grade of distor-
tion of the original publication, etc.
The main conclusions are the following:
o the authentic sense and reliability seem to be secondary criteria 
for spreading the information on religious topics through the 
mass media. The primary one is the sensational character of the 
news, their correspondence to the mass myths and stereotypes. 
Even after appearing in the Russian mass media the authentic and 
truthful information stressing the fact that Vatican did not announce 
any “new seven mortal sins”, during the next several days this topic 
was developed as a “snow-ball” misinforming the audience;
o quite often the mass media invite as experts in diverse problems 
the people who are not competent experts. In the searched story, 
just in three cases Catholic priests were the experts, in five other 
texts – priests of the Russian Orthodox Church. In most cases jour-
nalists did not apply for the comment at all;
o very often journalists have no critical attitude to the religious 
news from abroad. They are not intended to check the informa-
tion looking for independent information sources. Just reading 
the initial article in “L’Osservatore Romano” could be enough to 
understand the aberrations and mistakes made in “La Repubblica” 
which “created” this “sensation”, transmitted later on by ВВС, Reu-
ters and “The Times”; 
o having the Internet as a powerful tool for obtaining the informa-
tion and checking it, Russian journalists instead of this use it for 
the further immediate spreading of unproven facts and opinions. 
The uncritical media become the space for the birth, growth, and 
support of myths and stereotypes regarding the religious life – a very 
delicate and sensitive sphere. Such a practice has already caused many 
problems and may cause them in future.
The “trace-study” results give us an opportunity for the concern 
about the role of a journalist in the dialogue between religions and 
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society. Among three main roles of journalists – peacemaker, mediator 
and provocateur – the last one, with “sharpening” the picture and 
making it more “scandalous”, becomes the leading one. Our research 
results show exactly the crisis of professionalism and responsibility.
The results of the research confirm some empirically fixed facts and 
trends of dysfunction and corruption in the religious life coverage in Rus-
sia almost ten years back (Kashinskaya, Lukina, Resnianskaya, 2002):
o the biased approach by journalists, tolerated by their colleagues;
o the lack of education in religious issues and therefore the lack of 
understanding of what is really going on;
o urgent need of specialized media focused on religious life;
o secular media dependence on political and influential Russian 
Orthodox Church elites;
o and, therefore, religious minorities are underexposed in the pub-
lic sphere.
In order to describe this very sensitive aspect, we made a survey on 
the Catholic minority (1% of Russian population) as an example illus-
trating the general situation with religious minorities media coverage 
in Russia. 
We conducted a study of news agencies materials about religious 
life. The main conclusion is that the media appear to be the instrument 
of the marginalization of “strangers” (e.g., they describe Catholics just as 
a Western phenomenon). 
The media texts represent the Catholic Church as the Church of 
foreigners. Journalists systematically use words adopted from foreign 
languages, despite the masses use Russian, the majority of Catholics 
are ethnic Russians using Russian in everyday life; Russian is used in 
Catholic publications and documents. This creates the stereotype that 
Catholics in Russia are foreigners who do not want to integrate into the 
local culture.
The media strengthen the opposition of “our faith” and “faith of out-
siders”. The ethnical and geographical determinism takes place, myths 
and stereotypes of mass consciousness dominate in agencies’ publica-
tions.
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There is the dependence on the state policy in the religious sphere. 
It is not strongly articulated but could be seen in signs of attention to 
religious organizations (to the so-called “traditional” religions – Ortho-
doxy, Islam, Judaism, and Buddhism).
The Russian media has formed the image of the “church-stranger” in 
the mind of ordinary audience and in the perception of decision-ma-
king officials.
The analysis of the Russian media system, focused on religious life 
coverage, the qualitative analysis of the religious content of the press, the 
quantitative analysis of the representation of religious topics in Russian 
news agencies, a “trace-study” of religious news in the Russian informa-
tion space give us a strong argument to suggest that the mass media play a 
rather negative role both for religion organizations and for the audience.
Covering religion, journalists in Russia with a widely developed 
“copy-pasting” practice without checking the facts in independent 
sources are still far from these principles.
Questioning journalists for the spreading of myths and stereotypes, 
we have to be objective and look to religions in Russia themselves: are 
they transparent and active enough? Are they intended to feed journa-
lists with sufficient information to be transmitted to the audience? 
There is a set of problems which seems to us to be a significant context 
for religious life coverage.
Not only the mass media but also religions themselves have to con-
tribute to agenda setting and to the elaboration of mediatization mecha-
nisms in this very sensitive sphere. 
Besides the difficulties of translation from the old-fashion “dog-
matic” language into the modern Russian and also the problems with 
understanding the internal functionality of churches and other religious 
organizations, there are some expectations from the Russian society 
religions do not fit, and this causes a lack of confidence in religions.
Openness and transparency in terms of values presume also the 
moral voices of different religious organizations. But in fact the reli-
gious “ethos” is actually visible and heard in the Russian public sphere 
just from time to time.
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2. Religion ethos as a reference point for moral accountability
Is the religious ethos and – in particular – religious normative ap-
proach to the media known and taken seriously by practicing journal-
ists?
In case of journalism, the formation of the professional ethos could 
be a factor of integration through the virtues and the true origin of pro-
fessional competence, but the practice in Russia is still far from the de-
scribed model.
The notion of “religious ethos” in fact has a very narrow area of 
use because it is a speculative generic concept for different kinds of 
“ethoses” – Christian, Jewish, Muslim, etc. – which derive from the 
“creed”, the fundamental commandments of a particular religion.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to focus the future studies on the im-
pact of religious ethos on the journalistic culture, on a particular ethos 
dominating in the society – Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, 
Jewish, Buddhist, etc. 
According to the results of our research conducted over the last 
years, the contradictions are mostly located not among the religious 
normative models and the ethical codes of journalism, but among the 
religious understanding what journalists are expected to do and what 
they do in real practice. 
Dysfunctions in the implementation of ethical codes lead to a strong 
criticism of the Russian media and journalists from different pers-
pectives, religious as well. However, the criticism from the religious 
perspective in Russia has several particular features rooted in the local 
context.
Public opinion. Religion concepts and values after many decades 
of systematic “atheisation” by state authorities are low-profiled in the 
Russian public opinion (the level of awareness of Christian, Muslim, 
Jewish, etc. “creeds” and cultural heritage is still low and self-contradic-
tory in comparison to Western countries).
Publicity. Problems with religious ethos and social doctrine articu-
lation in the public domain: 
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(a) internal problems – the lack of production. The moral monito-
ring of social life from the religious perspective is minimal;
(b) interaction problems – the lack of understanding. The translation 
not only of words but also of concepts and normative models from the 
ecclesial language into secular is still problematic in Russia (the recent 
initiative of the Russian Orthodox Church to launch the “media mistakes 
collector” seems to be a friendly step towards mutual understanding);
(c) external problems – the lack of channels to translate, so the voi-
ces of religious leaders are not heard in society.
Autonomy of journalists. According to the recent studies, journa-
lists in Russia do not enjoy their autonomy, because of their political 
and economic dependence. (Without proper autonomy, they are not 
free enough to take into consideration the religious ethos and some-
times even professional codes – when the superiors enforce them to 
write stories “pre-paid” by third parties).
Аgenda-setting and management. The agenda-setting process in the 
media is not ethics-oriented (the main players are mostly focused not 
on the audience, not on public interest, but on political subordination 
and commercial profit, therefore the moral issues are secondary). 
Objectivity. The poor and stereotyped coverage of religious life in 
the secular media leads to the marginalization of religious ethos (and 
this dysfunction is not a concern issue because of the minor weight of 
religious subjects in comparison with “heavy weight” political and eco-
nomic aspects).
Content. Ethical ignorance in the media content (“infotainment” - 
and “advertainment” - oriented media decision makers do not seem to 
be concerned with fitting their products into even secular moral norms, 
so religious norms as more strict are ever more ignored).
The above-described problems and conditions, taken seriously, do 
not leave too much space for the religious ethos impact on journalism 
culture in Russia in general. Therefore, several attempts to make an im-
pact on the mass media from religious moral perspectives failed in Rus-
sia. One of them was the Orthodox initiative of the public council for 
morality in TV, which finally was not established.
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Neutral and ambivalent research data are not enough for the expli-
cation and analysis of latent motivations and intentions of journalists. 
Value-oriented and ethos-focused interpretation theories, based on 
fundamental normative models, seem to be more suitable and heuristi-
cally promising for the explanation of the media trends and the “fluc-
tuations” of the journalistic culture.
3. The Public Council on Morality for TV:  
censorship or call for accountability?
A Public Council for Morality on TV was proposed by the Club of 
Orthodox Journalists in November 2007, with support from the Mos-
cow Patriarchate.
One of the most respected men within the Russian Orthodox 
Church, Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin (Head of the Synodal Church 
and Society Department), believes that “the Council must not forbid 
anything, but should formulate a reason which will be brought to the 
viewers’ notice as to why something should be prohibited”.
“Establishing a public council to supervise the performance of fe-
deral TV channels would be a great thing to do. We have already agreed 
on its composition and range of authority”, the Glasnost Defense Foun-
dation President Alexei Simonov said. He is a well-known defender of 
freedom of speech in Russia. But he also insists on the necessity of jour-
nalists’ responsibility for the content presented and for the mass media. 
What are the reasons and arguments of those who are against the 
Council?
An opposing viewpoint is found among professional media public 
circles which are far less concerned about the spiritual side of the prob-
lem. The National Association of TV and Radio Broadcasters President 
Eduard Sagalayev stressed: “There is too little truth and too much vul-
garity on our television”. The information policy that has taken shape in 
Russia “does not provide for open debate and in fact does not provide 
for live broadcasts”.
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Pavel Gusev, Chairman of the Public Chamber’s Media and Free-
dom of Speech Commission, said that the media law had no clauses 
pertaining to the activity of publishers and media owners. 
The main point of “contra” voices is a “phobia” of the renewal or re-
birth of strong ideological control over the media endured in the USSR. 
The contra voices, having invested into “immoral” business on TV, very 
often claim that any attempt to regulate the media is an offensive step 
against the freedom of speech.
4. Fundamental obstacles for moral control initiative
The case for the Public Council for Morality on TV can be consi-
dered as an indicator of relations among the mass media, religions, and 
civil society in Russia. The evolution of civic attention to the Russian 
television means that its participants are moving from the opportunity 
of participation in the agenda-setting process, or at least influencing this 
agenda setting and the media contents formation, to the necessity of 
control. The systematic neglect of citizens as active subjects in the infor-
mation process, the imitation of their participation in the TV activity 
(as crowd scenes at talk-shows), and the arrogant reluctance to work 
with the audience have led to a situation where the most active citizens 
and public institutions that have expressed the desire for social control 
cannot participate in it.
Within the frames of public debates over the idea of the Public Coun-
cil for Morality, the major objections refer to practical questions, while 
the main obstacles significantly complicating the essence and sense of 
future activity of the council have not yet been articulated. Surely, the 
presence of obstacles in such a society as Russia’s calls for the principles 
of establishing such a council as problematic.
There is a set of problems in regards to the Public Council for 
Morality on TV project which seem significant to us as we consider the 
possibility for this project to be realized. 
There is a set of problems that seem significant in the analysis of the 
possibility of the realization of the Public Council for Morality on TV 
project. 
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4.1. The axiological problem: the lack of value consensus  
in the Russian society
In a multi-normative society in which different values and norma-
tive models caused by poly-confessional and poly-ethnic social struc-
ture coexist and which would be affected by other factors of diversity, 
the activity of any council for morality would be successful only if there 
would be a critical level of agreement of what is “good” and what is 
“bad.”
Moreover, reaching the “zone of agreement,” a minimum of “axio-
logical unity” seems to be increasingly remote at the present time. Ac-
cording to my observations, during the last decades centrifugal forces 
damaging the values and normative space of social life are more evi-
dent than the centripetal forces gathering and uniting society, leading it 
to the agreement on the question of values. Here, we do not mean the 
vertically forced indoctrination, the attempts of a normative uniting of 
values made “from above.” These attempts – if we look at the possible 
consequences – are seemingly the catalysts of “centrifugal forces”.
The modern world offers a great variety and variability of ethi-
cal norms and ideas about what is moral and what is not linked to the 
most important world view categories of a person – the attitude toward 
death, the idea of family, the understanding of social justice, etc. The 
conditions of relativist occasional ethics in pluralism destroyed the 
fragile social unity in the Soviet Union quite rapidly (if we assume that 
such unity existed at all).
In conditions of growing variability, the elaboration of a joint and 
united idea of good and evil becomes more and more problematic. For 
instance, a TV program where polygamy is represented in a positive 
way could be acceptable for Muslims but would provoke protests by 
Orthodox believers. The publication supporting the family status of ho-
mosexual couples becomes the reason for indignation for the followers 
of traditional religions but fits well enough within the frame of liberal 
worldviews of modern youth. A public discussion over euthanasia has 
already divided several European countries. The list of examples could 
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be continued. It is hard to imagine them as subjects of discussion at the 
meeting of the Public Council for Morality on TV, and it is even more 
difficult to think about the possibility to arrive at one, united, judgment 
of its members. It is a more realistic possibility in mono-confessional, 
mono-ethnic, and theocratic countries.
That is why it is not surprising that two “test” sessions of the Coun-
cil took place in the atmosphere of discussions in which the opinions 
of participants became divided. This is quite natural in the above-de-
scribed context.
“What criteria will the members of the Public Council use in or-
der to define what is moral and what is not?” was the question raised 
by N. Gevorkyan, a journalist of “Gazeta”. Does Saveliy Yamshikov use 
the same criteria as Vitaliy Tretiakov, and does Mikhail Leontiev use 
the same ones as Pavel Lungin does? I’d like to understand – whether 
the words and actions of boys and maids from the “Dom-2” project are 
more immoral than the jokes which are offered to TV viewers for many 
hours per month trying to change them into brainless cretins? Do they 
consider such a “humor” immoral? Do they consider the bloody and 
morbid nightmare and horror translated by the NTV channel more 
moral that the “Dom-2” project”? (Gevorkian, 2008).
The problem of the fundamental possibility of consensus on values 
is very rarely mentioned in the Russian mass media. To our mind, this 
is the main obstacle to analyzing this initiative. It is the main but not the 
unique barrier.
4.2. The evaluative problem: absence of moral monitoring  
in the mass media and public sphere from value defined groups
We are convinced that the highest level for aggregate judgment in 
the moral sphere is not the society of the entire country, but a morally 
united monolithic homogeneous community whose members have a con-
sensus about good and bad. The uniting factor of such community is ex-
actly common morals. That is why they could be named “crystallization 
centers” of the society if we use ethical indication, they could be also 
named the “magnets” or “leading lights.” Religious organizations and 
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other institutions with an explicitly expressed moral “credo” should be 
put in this group.
They should be the main participants of a social dialogue in the mo-
ral sphere accumulating and articulating the value judgments rooted in 
fundamental normative models (such as of Torah, the Bible, Qur’an, 
the Book of Mormon, the oath of Hippocrates, etc.) used in different 
situations of the modern practice and activity. The total weight of these 
voices in the polyphonic choir would be admittedly louder than the 
voices of particular followers of some exotic ethical system.
Political parties and trade unions, clubs and other organizations 
where the uniting factor towards ethical issues is external (fight for 
power, assertion of professional interest, getting income, love for foot-
ball or sauna, etc.) are not, and fundamentally cannot be, morally ho-
mogeneous social institutions. Maximally, it is possible to discover 
their conventional professional ethics. The idea of good and evil, apart 
from official activity, is removed from the discussion to the private au-
tonomous sphere of the members’ life.
The problem is that there is no system of the “moral monitoring” of 
events and phenomena of social life in the media and the public sphere 
made by acting and value-defined communities. The light of “moral 
leading lights” is not seen, they are poorly visible, poorly evident on the 
horizon of public consciousness. In this context, the moral navigation 
of citizens is hardly realizable. Being confused in conditions of value di-
versity, quite often Russians are not able to make sensible choices; they 
are liable to the normative pressure of different forces. 
Even the voice of the most powerful of sources and opportunities 
and theoretically the most united community in modern Russia – the 
Russian Orthodox Church – is not heard regularly and systematically. 
The Church gives estimations in an аd hoc manner – when some scan-
dalous and extremely immoral thing happens, as it was, for instance, 
with “The Last Temptation of Christ” film release, with the concert of 
pop-singer Madonna crucifying herself on a cross, etc.
In ordinary life, there is no regular production and distribution of 
morally evaluated judgments of TV production and a wider enuncia-
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tion of diverse socially significant problems and situations made by the 
Russian Orthodox Church. Moreover, as a press officer of the Russian 
Orthodox Church (priest Vladimir Vigilyanskiy) said that the Moscow 
Patriarchate did not plan to establish the structures for regular moral 
evaluation of cinema and TV production like ones created by the Ro-
man Catholic Church (Orthodox Council, 2008). Meanwhile, at the 
Catholic Bishops Conference in the USA and in some Catholic count-
ries there are special institutions constantly monitoring the cultural life 
(primarily monitoring the film and television industry) and publishing 
a list of the main events and news of this or that sphere with reviews 
every week. From time to time Muslim leaders also publish the texts of 
normative and value contents – fatwa – actualizing dogma in the social 
sphere. The aim of such an activity in the field of TV consumption is to 
support believers in making decisions of what is worth seeing and what 
is not. These cases might also be found in other religions. 
4.3. Communicative problem: the absence of a well-articulated 
dialogue of value systems
If the moral monitoring of current events and facts does have a 
place, if the “leading light” works properly, it would be possible to speak 
about an articulated dialogue of value systems within the framework of 
constructing a normative model. In particular, communication about 
moral norms and their implementation for codifying facts and events in 
society is a fundamental and necessary condition for the formation of a 
balanced broadcasting policy.
Naturally, this communication of value systems in the public sphere 
might be problematic, difficult and even conflicting, but it would con-
tribute to the agenda setting and to elaboration of mediating mecha-
nisms in the sphere of moral values. Moral dialogue in society is seen 
more naturally as a polyphony of voices of mutually respecting axiolo-
gical homogeneous social institutions than as a dissonant choir of voi-
ces of members of the Public Council who may be respected in society 
but are personalities singing in different keys. 
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Conclusion
The former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s decision to estab-
lish the Public TV channel (April 17, 2012) faced an immediate critical 
discourse (also from religious organizations) focused on the principal 
“architectonic” mistake: the public TV established “from above” can 
not be really independent (i.e. public in stricto senso). Despite the pre-
dominantly negative reaction of civic activists and media professionals, 
a bill that creates a legislative base for the public television was passed 
in the Russian Parliament ( June 2012), the new President Vladimir Pu-
tin approved members of the Public Television Supervisory Board and 
appointed its general director ( July, 2012). Later on, Prime Minister 
Dmitry Medvedev signed a document establishing the Public TV (Ob-
shchestvennoe televidenie Rossii – OTR) as an independent non-commer-
cial organization (September 2012).
In contrast to the European “success stories”, the history of the at-
tempts to create the Public TV in Russia and to implement it in the 
existing media system for the last two decades has been the history of 
failures.
Formally, the public television could become a powerful tool for 
the modernization of Russia and of its traditional “vertical” practices of 
political decision-making. But in fact, if the plan is being implemented 
without a huge public debate and corrections from the expert com-
munity, intelligentsia, and from the grassroots, it may become one more 
simu lacrum in order just to look like a democratic institute of a civil so-
ciety.
Formally, the Public TV in Russia does exist and started to broad-
cast on the 19th of May 2013, but there are many unclear things and 
unanswered questions – legal, ethical, financial, social, professional, etc. 
Not only experts but also ordinary people would like to know more 
about the place of a new channel in the general broadcasting policy, its 
structure, funding and – most of all – guarantees of its independence, 
but the lack of transparency makes the first steps of the Public TV a 
rather “un-public” and not influential actor within the Russian media 
system.
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According to the results of the representative of all Russian popula-
tion public opinion poll conducted in August 2013 by the fund “Ob-
shchestvennoe mnenie” (FOM), only about a third of Russians (32%) 
knew that the OTR channel began broadcasting. However, only 9% of 
the citizens have seen a transmission of the OTR, and only 6% of these 
respondents said that they liked the new TV channel. At the same time, 
10% of the OTR audience disliked it.
Dean of the High School of Economics Faculty of Media 
Communications Anna Kachkaeva has reminded that “public television 
implies conversation with society, not with 6% of the population”. In her 
opinion, the OTR conceptually “has no way to increase its audience” 
(Kachkaeva, 2013).
So, the mission of the Public TV in Russia could be preliminarily 
described as providing an attractive alternative to the state-commercial 
broadcasting establishment, creating conditions for overcoming the 
social and political apathy of the Russian population, involvement of 
public broadcasting viewers who have lost motivation for watching 
television and listening radio and building the culture of participation 
in the public life.
The factors described above seem to be essential for the developing 
of the Russian Public TV “fail-safe” model in order to orient the Russian 
media system towards public interest and to take into consideration the 
religious initiative for its co-regulation.
Religious attempts to influence the media and to control them from 
the moral perspective in Russia are still weak and unsuccessful because 
of the described above factors. However, cases in some European 
countries with a strong religious “lobby” in the public sphere (Poland, 
Italy, Ireland, Greece, etc.) efforts of such kind are much more successful. 
Therefore, the religious factor in the media regulation in Russia still has 
a significant potential in the media regulation – but under the principal 
condition of developing towards a civil – not autocratic – society.
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